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11 Introduction
National saving rates diﬀer substantially across countries, even within the more economically
developed. Recent comprehensive surveys by Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996) and
Attanasio (1999) stress that the only way to understand the diﬀerences in the aggregate numbers
is by analysing the microeconomic survey data. Only then can it be ascertained whether the
diﬀerences are caused by diﬀerences in institutional structure, diﬀerences in economic incentives,
or diﬀerences in national behaviour. An exhaustive list of the possible factors that might account
for diﬀerences in aggregate saving rates would include:
1. Demography. The balance of the population between those yet to join the workforce, those
of working age and those retired will inﬂuence the savings rate. As households tend to
save more when working, the savings rate will be higher in countries where the proportion
of people of working age is higher, other things being equal.
2. The welfare state. If the retired receive state pensions, health care and other state beneﬁts
that are ﬁnanced predominantly out of taxes levied on people of working age, then saving
will be lower relative to a country in which people need to make greater personal provision
for their retirement.
3. Retirement behaviour. In a country where people retire later, then all other things being
equal, they are likely to save less than those in a country where they tend to retire earlier.
4. Constraints on Borrowing. People may wish to borrow, particularly when young, to ﬁnance
house purchases or immediate consumption with the intention of repaying the loan later.
If access to loans in one country is tighter or more regulated relative to another, then this
country is likely to have a higher saving ratio.
5. Income distribution over a lifetime. The way in which income varies with age may diﬀer
from country to country, in part because diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent systems of
tertiary education. This should be expected to have some inﬂuence on saving rates.
6. Income uncertainty. If people in one country face more income uncertainty than in another,
and especially if they are borrowing constrained, they will save more to insure themselves
against adverse income shocks.
7. Capital gains. The national accounts do not include capital gains on assets as part of
income. Hence if people in one country hold on average a higher proportion of their assets
as corporate equity (whose return can be substantially in the form of capital gains) than
in another then their measured saving ratio is likely to be lower everything else being the
same.
In this paper we attempt to quantify the importance of these factors in determining the
national savings rates by attributing the diﬀerences in net national saving rates to diﬀerences
in household characteristics and resources, using an approach similar to Gokhale et al. (1996).
However, whereas Gokhale et al. (1996) studied the evolution of saving behaviour over time in
1one country, we study cross-country diﬀerences. Such a cross-country comparison is insightful;
we shall show that the diﬀerent aggregate national saving rates in the UK, US and Italy can be
traced back to the very diﬀerent household distributions of economic resources and characteris-
tics. Though we recognise that it will always be possible to improve on our analysis, particularly
as more data becomes available, we believe that this study does highlight which of the above
factors are quantitatively more important than others.
Recently, two large-scale projects investigated the cross-country diﬀerences in household
saving behaviour resulted in books edited by Poterba (1994) and by B¨ orsch-Supan (2003). These
volumes contain detailed studies of individual countries within a common framework, which
allows a description of diﬀerences in household saving behaviour across countries. These studies
discuss potentially important factors that aﬀect saving behaviour in each country, but here we
try to quantify their relative importance. To achieve this, it is necessary to make stronger
assumptions, and so our analysis should be considered as building on theirs.
These studies analyse micro-level individual and household data, as a means to explain
diﬀerences in aggregate economic variables. However Gokhale et al. (1996) suggest using the
life-cycle model of consumption savings as a way of quantitatively attributing the aggregate
diﬀerences to diﬀerences in the micro data. In its simplest form, the life-cycle model suggests that
individuals, faced with a ﬁnite life span and a concentrated and uncertain income stream, save
so as to smooth their consumption; by borrowing when income is low and saving when it is high.
More precisely it states that consumption in any period, is equal to an individual’s propensity
to consume times the expected presented discounted sum of his or her future resources. Given
that we can observe average consumption, and estimate the expected presented discounted sum
of future resources, we can also calculate the individuals’ implied propensity to consume. We
are thus able to attribute the diﬀerences in savings behaviour of a representative individual or
equivalently a cohort into diﬀerences in the time proﬁle or distribution of incomes across cohorts
and diﬀerences in the propensity to consume.
For this paper, we have developed a unique data set of the distribution of all incomes and
allocation of all expenditures of the household sector by age and sex for the base year of 1997
in the three countries: United Kingdom, United States and Italy.1 These data are constructed
using survey data from many sources; they are then benchmarked to the total amount received or
spent on each category in the respective national accounts totals. In this way we able to derive a
consistent breakdown of personal sector savings by age and sex for each country. Our analysis of
these data suggest that the diﬀerences between these three countries can be predominantly traced
down to two factors only. First, people in the US retire far later than their counterparts in the
UK and Italy, so they save less. Secondly, we ﬁnd that young Italians save more than either their
US or UK counterparts. We suggest that the lower estimated propensity to consume of young
Italians is due to borrowing constraints and in particular the high proportional downpayment for
house purchases required in Italy. This has been well-documented by both Jappelli and Pagano
(1999) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000).
Our analysis, described so far, has highlighted the importance of the inter-generational dis-
tribution of resources, including the distribution of wealth, as well as age-speciﬁc propensities
1We would like to thank Jagadeesh Gokhale and Larry Kotlikoﬀ for the data on the US (which we updated)
and Roberto Carderelli and Maria Cozzolino for some of Italian proﬁles, particulary on health expenditures.
2to consume in explaining the diﬀerences in saving behaviour. However some of these distri-
butions are jointly determined, in particular the age-speciﬁc propensities to consume and the
distribution of wealth. In order to account for this, we generate age speciﬁc wealth holdings
for every country, consistent with our estimates of the age-speciﬁc propensities to consume. We
then recalculate our decomposition, using the generated distributions of wealth. We ﬁnd that
the conclusions from this experiment are in close agreement with those from the ﬁrst. The very
same factors explain the diﬀerences in saving behavior in the three countries.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a discussion of related research
and discusses diﬀerences in savings rates between our three countries. We then describe in
detail the method which we use to decompose diﬀerences in national savings across countries.
Section 3 discusses our data set and related measurement issues (some more details are given in
the appendix of the associated working paper, Kirsanova and Sefton (2006)). We also discuss
how the constructed proﬁles reﬂect the stylised facts for each country. Section 4 discuss our
main result: the decomposition of diﬀerences in saving rates between countries. In Section 5
we investigate the sensitivity of our results to various assumptions, in particular private inter-
generational transfers and the joint determinacy of consumption and wealth proﬁles. Section 6
concludes.
2 Micro Analysis of Saving Rates
The idea of decomposing aggregate saving rates into several factors, which can be traced down to
household behaviour, has a long tradition in macroeconomics. Bosworth et al. (1991), Attanasio
(1998) and Gokhale et al. (1996) have used micro survey data on household and individual
saving rates in order to analyse the decline in the US saving rates. Jappelli and Pagano (1999)
used a similar approach to examine reasons for the high personal sector saving rates in Italy.
Attanasio and Banks (1998) were the ﬁrst to use micro data to compare saving decisions across
two countries, the US and UK, but their work focused on whether tax incentives encouraged
saving.























t is total income of the personal sector in period t,
Ct is total consumption of the personal sector in period t,
Nt is the total population in period t,
ya,t is the average total per capita income of an individual aged a in period t,
ca,t is the average per capita consumption of an individual aged a in period t,
na,t is the number individuals aged a in period t.
The personal sector saving rate, therefore, can be aﬀected by the distribution of individual
age-speciﬁc saving rates, by income distribution by age and by the population distribution.
This approach implicitly makes the reasonable assumption that both the age-speciﬁc saving
rates and the distribution of income by age, at least to a ﬁrst approximation, are independent
3of the demographic composition of the population.2 However, it is more problematic to use this
method in order to explain changes in saving rates by the changes in the age-speciﬁc saving rates,
(ya,t − ca,t)/ya,t or by the changes in the distribution of income by age, ya,t/(Yt/Nt). Clearly,
the age-speciﬁc saving rate is a function of the age-speciﬁc income amongst other things, and so
can not be treated independently.
This approach is also diﬃcult to apply if we want to assess implications of individual be-
haviour for national saving. Gokhale et al. (1996) discuss that personal savings do not determine
national savings. Diﬀerent classiﬁcations of social security contributions in diﬀerent countries
leave national savings unchanged, but imply diﬀerent levels of personal saving. In a cross-country
study, as Jappelli (2001) argues in his critique of the previous work in this area, it is essential to
adjust for the diﬀerence in scale of mandatory and discretionary contributions to pension funds.
This is because the national accounts treat mandatory contributions like a tax but discretionary
contributions like savings. Hence personal sector saving rates can give a misleading picture of
the amount of saving that is undertaken in diﬀerent countries.
Another area, which is not discussed in such detail in Gokhale et al. (1996) but is particularly
important in the this study, is any systematic diﬀerences in private sector ﬁnancing. Table 1
is a summary of the sectoral accounts for all three countries in 1997 on a comparable basis. In
the UK, private sector savings is roughly three times personal sector savings; in the US the two
are roughly equal and in Italy private sector saving is negligible. As an illustration of how such
large diﬀerences can arise, compare the impact on the respective savings rates of a company that
pays out all after tax earnings as dividends and raises all new ﬁnance for capital expenditures
through new equity issue with a company that retains enough of its earnings to ﬁnance its capital
expenditures. In the former case the capital expenditures will appear as part of personal sector
savings and in the latter they will appear as corporate sector savings. However the distinction
is predominantly an accounting one. To see through such possible diﬀerences, it is necessary to
investigate savings rates at the national level where the distinction washes out.
In this paper we therefore focus directly on household consumption and on national saving.
We deﬁne net national saving rate as (Y − C − G)/Y where Y refers to net national income
at market prices, C to household3 consumption and G to government purchases (collective
consumption). Table 1 reports sector accounts for the three countries on a consistent basis;
this allows us to compute comparable national and household saving rates. Our measure of
the household saving rate (we follow Gokhale et al. (1996) in this choice), is deﬁned as (Y −
C − G)/(Y − G) and is reported in Table 2. This is the share of output after government
consumption saved by the private sector. This saving rate is not aﬀected by present value
neutral changes in the timing of income ﬂows. Nor is it altered by changes in the classiﬁcation
of government receipts and expenditures, assuming all agents are rational and are not deceived
by the government’s choice of language, nor by diﬀerences in corporate ﬁnancing.
We study household saving decisions using a simple life-cycle model. This suggests that the
appropriate measure of household saving is the propensity to consume out of the present value of
2Bosworth et al. (1991) use this decomposition to demonstrate that changes to the age distribution of the US
population, pa,t = na,t/N, could not account for the fall in the US personal sector’s saving rate over the 1980s
and 1990s.
3In this paper we use the terms personal sector and household sector interchangeably. This is because we
allocate all expenditure of Non-Proﬁt Insitutions serving Households (NPISH) to households.
4their remaining life-cycle resources. This propensity is invariant to present-value neutral changes
in timing of after-tax income ﬂows, each of which produces a diﬀerent value of personal saving.
Using a life-cycle model, we decompose diﬀerences in saving rates (which can be small) into
the sum of several eﬀects (each of which can be large). In brief, the algorithm is as follows. In
the standard life-cycle model each cohort’s consumption is proportional to the present value of
its remaining life-time resources, that is
ca,t = αa (ha,t + wa,t), (2)
where αa is the average propensity to consume out of resources of an individual aged a. In
theory, this relationship is age-dependent, but independent of time.4 For an individual of age
a at time t, his resources are the sum of his asset holdings, wa,t, and the present value ha,t of
his total non-capital income, yNC
a,t . Non-capital income, yNC
a,t , is the sum of labour earnings yL
a,t,
plus state, public (unfunded and funded) and private pension contributions and payments5, yP
a,t,
plus all net monetary transfers with the government yT








Total income, ya,t, is then the sum of non-capital income, yNC
a,t , and capital income (the returns
to wealth net of taxes), yC
a,t. The present value of the individual’s resources is estimated by
assuming that the individual expects that his relative age proﬁle of the distribution of all the
diﬀerent components of income remain constant over time. The level of these per capita resources
will grow at the productivity growth rate g: for an individual aged a at time t, with current
income ya,t, his future income at time t + s will be ya+s,t+s = (1 + gt+s)sya+s,t. Of course,
this assumption implies that our individuals are bounded-rational: the current cross-sectional
proﬁles, with incurred cohort speciﬁc eﬀects, are treated as expected proﬁles.6 The income
streams are given at present value by assuming interest rates are constant and by making the
























where rs is real interest rate and µs is probability to survive another year being s−1 years old.
The aggregate consumption at time t is Ct =
P
a
ca,tna,t and the total resources are Rt =
P
a
(ha,t + wa,t)na,t. We deﬁne the net national saving rate as SRt = (Yt − Ct − Gt)/Yt, where
Yt is the net national income. The decomposition of national saving rate under the life-cycle
4Farmer (1990) derives this solution to the stochastic choice problem with ﬁnite horizon assuming that indivi-
udals have Risk-Neutral Constant Elasticity (RINCE) preferences.
5We need to treat all pensions, private and state, as if they are run on the same basis. This facilitates
comparisons across the countries. There are more details of this point later in the paper.
6We thus assume that all individuals form expectations conditioned on the same set of variables, that the
individuals and the researcher have the same information set and that the researcher knows how individual
expectations are formed.
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na,t is total population. In the second line of formula (3) we used the new
notation for the distribution of population, pa,t =
na,t
Nt , the distribution of non-capital resources,
ψa,t = ha,tNt/Rt, the distribution of capital resources, ωa,t = wa,tNt/Rt, for the resource to
income ratio, ρt = Rt/Yt, and for the share of government consumption γt = Gt/Yt.
Equation (3) can now be used to decompose diﬀerences in saving rates between countries
into the four major components, caused by the diﬀerence in the following:
1. average propensities to consume, αa,t;
2. the demographic factors (the age distribution of the population pa,t);
3. the total resources. We shall breakdown the total eﬀect of resources into (a) the eﬀect of
age distribution component and (b) the level of resources component. The eﬀect of life-
time distribution of resources is also split into the eﬀect of (i) non-capital resources ψa,t
and (ii) capital resources ωa,t. The non-capital resources are split into labour income yL
a,t,
net pension income yP
a,t and taxes and beneﬁts, which, in their turn, are net government
monetary transfers yT
a,t and beneﬁts in kind yK
a,t.
4. government consumption share, γt.
This decomposition, in a sense, presents total eﬀect of diﬀerent factors in a ‘reduced’ form.
There are some causes, which aﬀect more than one component. For example imperfect capital
markets may aﬀect both the propensity to consume and the decision to work and therefore
resources. Similarly, if the inter-temporal elasticity of consumption is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one then interest rates may aﬀect both the propensity to consume and the level of available
resources. Importantly, an increase in productivity, resulting in higher real wage growth, may
aﬀect both the distribution of resources and the resource to output ratio. With higher expected
real wage growth, the young increase spending. This reduces the national saving rate. However,
over the longer run the resource to output ratio is likely to grow too, oﬀsetting the eﬀect. Our
approach is unable to disentangle these eﬀects. In this paper, we only attempt to quantify
diﬀerences in terms of these six factors, and only discuss their possible causes.
Now, the last three factors are observable. This is in contrast to the ﬁrst source, the average
propensity to consume, which is derived. Hence, interpretation of the diﬀerences in saving rates
due to diﬀerences in the average propensities to consume requires more thought.
Diﬀerences in the average propensity to consume (APC) between countries can be caused
by a number of factors; Blanchard (1985) shows that the APC is a function of mortality rates
and expected future interest rates, Jappelli and Pagano (1989) that it is a aﬀected by borrowing
constraints, Banks et al. (1994) that it is a function of future family size and Caballero (1991)
6that it is aﬀected by the degree of income uncertainty. All three countries are very similar in
some of these respects, and very diﬀerent in others.
Both the UK and the US have fairly liberalised open capital markets, and have similar
borrowing constraints. Italy, however, is diﬀerent. In a series of papers, Jappelli and Pagano
(1989), Guiso et al. (1992b), Guiso and Jappelli (1998), Jappelli and Pagano (1999) and Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2000), the authors have investigated the eﬀects of the tight capital markets
on saving behaviour in Italy. They document extensively ‘the dearth of mortgage lending’ in
Italy and the consequent need for Italians to ﬁnance their home purchases predominantly from
accumulated savings. The reason for this ‘dearth’ is that Italian law makes it very diﬃcult and
therefore costly for a mortgage company to repossess a house should the borrower fall behind
with repayments. The mortgage companies therefore require large downpayments to protect
themselves against this eventuality. However nearly 61% of Italians households do succeed in
raising the capital and are home-owners (Jappelli and Pagano (1999)), as compared to 68% in
the UK and 65% in the US (Holmans (1994)). Jappelli and Pagano (1999) also document that
in the late 1980s consumer credit as a percentage of consumption expenditure was also low in
Italy, only 4% as compared to 10% and 20% in the UK and US respectively.
The presence of these borrowing constraints would unequivocally reduce the average propen-
sity to consume. Having found that the average propensity to consume in Italy is signiﬁcantly
lower than in the UK and US, we shall therefore interpret this as an evidence in support of
Jappelli and Pagano’s thesis that Italians, and especially young Italians, face more borrowing
constraints than their peer groups in the US and UK.
The degree of income uncertainty exacerbates the eﬀects of the borrowing constraints on
the APC. Without borrowing constraints, an adverse income shock would result in borrowing
in order to spread the eﬀect of the shock over several periods. With borrowing constraints,
households will accumulate a greater stock of precautionary savings, reducing consumption and
APC. Guiso et al. (2002), Kapteyn and Panis (2003) and Das and Donkers (1999) argue that
the US face more income uncertainty than Italy. In particular, Guiso et al. (2002) explicitly
compare the subjective wage and employment risk in the two countries. They demonstrate that
tighter regulation of Italian labor markets reduce substantially the employee’s perceived risk
of job dismissal relative to the United States. B¨ orsch-Supan (2003) ranks the UK in between
the other two countries. Our approach does not allow us to disentangle the eﬀect of borrowing
constraints and the eﬀect of income uncertainty on the APC. We return later to this point when
we interpret our results.
Family size is another possible source of diﬀerences in the propensities to consume. The
number of adults per household when the head of household is aged 45-65 is more than twice
as high in Italy than in the UK and US (see Figure 1). The main reason is that in Italy many
children choose to live with their parents until they can aﬀord the downpayment on their house;
see Guiso and Jappelli (1991). Given this is the cause, it can be argued that this diﬀerence
in behaviour is also a result of imperfect capital markets. Now these living arrangements will
aﬀect the cohort speciﬁc propensities to consume. Assuming the young adults work and there
are economies of scale in living together, then these arrangements will encourage individuals to
reallocate their consumption from the ages of 20-30 and 45-65 when they are sharing to other
periods of their lives when they are not. It will therefore reduce the estimates of the propensity
7to consume at these ages and increase it at the others. As such it will partly oﬀset the eﬀects
of the capital market restrictions. One would also expect that due to these living arrangements
there is likely to be larger inter-generational transfers from the middle-aged to the young. We
shall return to this later.
We do not expect any diﬀerences in APCs because of mortality rates, as they are almost iden-
tical in all three countries. We also assume that an individual’s planning horizon is determined
by known mortality rates.
Equation (3) can be used to decompose the diﬀerence in saving rates across time (Gokhale
et al. (1996)) or, in our case, across countries. It expresses the saving rate of country A as
a function of its cohort speciﬁc propensities to consume, αa, the normalised distribution of
their capital and non-capital resources, ωa,t and ψa,t, the age distribution of its population, pa,t,
and level of available resources, ρt. Gokhale et al. (1996) suggest substituting out one of these
constituent components with the respective quantity from country B. As the authors state, this
would ‘convey the potential importance of the diﬀerent saving determinants’, rather than giving
a precise quantiﬁcation of the size of the eﬀect.
Decomposition (3), however, has the following drawback. When substituting components
of human capital, we do not take account of the fact that if country A always had group B’s
income expectations then they would now have very diﬀerent holdings of assets and this, too,
could have a signiﬁcant bearing on the current national savings rate. In order to control for
simultaneity of wealth accumulation, we later try to simulate wealth, given projected income
distribution. This point is discussed in Section 5 of this paper.
We now start investigation of the diﬀerence in saving rates between our three countries using
Gokhale et al.’s (1996) framework. Following their approach, we use a deterministic model, so we
do not recognise uncertainty as a factor which would cause the diﬀerence in the saving behaviour.
We ignore this issue in order to exploit the simple framework only; in this framework, eﬀects of
uncertainty are automatically attributed to the one or more factors we study. We also use a no-
bequest life-cycle model and assume that parents do not draw utility from the time spent with
children; we state categorically that this is not to suggest that other determinants of savings are
unimportant, but that it provides a useful initial framework.
In the next section we discuss data construction and sources. We make the next section brief
in order to move quickly to the results, and so we address some further data construction and
measurement issues in Appendices A and B.
3 Data Sources and Measurement Issues
It is imperative in a cross-country study to take full account of all sources of income and
expenditure7. It is not suﬃcient to concentrate only on household income and consumption, as
generally recorded in the household surveys; it is also necessary to account for all beneﬁts in
kind as well as all monetary beneﬁts. For example, in a country where higher education tuition
fees are subsidised, students are much less likely to need to borrow and therefore personal sector
saving rates are likely to be higher than otherwise. Similarly, in a country where health care
7An omission in a time series study of a component of income may not have a signiﬁcant bearing on the results
if it remains roughly a similar proportion of individual’s income over time; in a cross country study it is unlikely
that this component will consitute a similar proportion of the income of individals in the diﬀerent countries.
8of the elderly is subsidised, people need to save less for their retirement and therefore savings
rates are likely to be lower. Additionally, in some countries these transfers may be received as a
money transfer, as is the case of Medicaid payments in the US, or as in kind beneﬁts, as is the
case for the health care provided by the NHS in the UK. There are large diﬀerences between
countries in the size of such in kind payments, being almost 20% of consumption expenditure in
the UK, around 15% in Italy and only 10% in the US; such diﬀerences are easily large enough
to have a major eﬀect on our results.
The necessity to account for all income in kind constrains us to work with cross-sectional
data, for one particular year.
3.1 Data Sources
We work with the data for 1997. This year was chosen as it was the latest year for which we had
data sources for all three countries of interest. We use representative cross-sectional surveys for
each country to construct age proﬁles of all resources and consumption, and we benchmarked
resulting distributions by age against national aggregates. This paper is accompanied by the
detailed appendix Kirsanova and Sefton (2006) where we explain in details how each particular
age proﬁle was constructed. We also report the level of under/over-reporting in household
surveys.
United Kingdom
Our main source for the aggregate data is Oﬃce for National Statistics (2000). For every item
in the National Accounts we construct age proﬁles using major UK household surveys. Main
sources of age proﬁles are the Family Resource Survey (FRS) and the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) which are repeated cross-section representative surveys of British households. We also
use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the General Household Survey (GHS) data
for the relevant year in order to check consistency of proﬁles. Additionally, we use age proﬁles
constructed for the “Generational Accounting in the UK” project. The paper by Cardarelli et al.
(2000) contains detailed appendix with all sources and methods for the government transfers
and income in kind.
United States of America
We use the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999) published by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Federal Reserve Board (2000) published by the Federal Reserve Board for
the aggregate data. We also use the number of household surveys to construct age proﬁles.
To construct the labour income data we use the Current Population Survey, to get proﬁles for
the government beneﬁts we use the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Statistical Bulletin,
and to construct private pension proﬁles and the life insurance proﬁles we use the data of
the American Association of Insures. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce and the Health Care
Financing Administration provide data on Medicare, Medicaid and education. We use the Survey
of Consumer Finance to obtain proﬁles on ﬁnancial wealth, and the Consumer Expenditure
Survey to obtain consumption proﬁles.
Italy
9Our main source of micro-data is the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW) which is a representative repeated cross sectional survey of Italian households
(see Jappelli and Pagano (1994), Jappelli and Pagano (1999) for the discussion). We also use
data on disaggregated consumption from the National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) Survey on
Household Consumption (SHC). Aggregate data are taken from the Italian National Accounts,
ISTAT (2000).
We use data from the Generational Accounting research project (Cardarelli and Sartor
(2000)) on government expenditures and income, which are obtained from various sources and
discussed in the detailed appendix Kirsanova and Sefton (2006). We use the SHIW for con-
sumption and wealth, including ﬁnancial wealth.
3.2 Individuals vs. households
Following Gokhale et al. (1996) we treat individuals, rather than households, as the life-cycle
decision makers. This approach is in line with recent research by Deaton and Paxton (2000).
They argue that households are simply ‘veils’ for a group of individuals; households are transient
entities that appear, transform and disappear through time. For example, one would not expect
two households both with a head of household aged 45 to behave in the same way, if one of
the heads is living on his own and another is married and supporting a 20 year old son and
70 year old mother. Therefore a model based on households as the basic economic unit would
need to adjust for the household size, age of the household members and possibly their inter-
relationships. Rather than attempt this diﬃcult task, we chose to treat individuals as our basic
unit. Deaton and Paxton’s (2000) research supports this approach as they found empirical
support for the life-cycle model at the individual level, but hardly any evidence was found at
the household level. We describe in Appendix A how we allocated the household consumption
and wealth among adult members of the household.
3.3 Treatment of Private Pensions
In 1997, the three countries had diﬀerent pension systems. The UK and the US had a similar mix
of PAYGO state and funded private pensions arrangements. But in Italy nearly all individuals
relied only on their PAYGO state pension; the value of private pension funds were negligible.
Hence in the UK and the US, a large proportion of personal sector wealth was held as ﬁnancial
assets in funded pension reserves, whereas the size of these funds was minimal in Italy.
In our approach, in common with both Bosworth et al. (1991) and Gokhale et al. (1996),
individuals do understand that mandatory pension contributions entitle them to beneﬁts when
old and so they are not ‘myopic’. This assumption is an essential ﬁrst step, as Jappelli (2001)
argues, if we are to account for diﬀerences in saving rates between countries.
However, there is an accounting issue. Both the European System of Accounts and the
National Income and Product Accounts consider saving in private pension funds as part of
personal sector saving, but mandatory saving in the form of social insurance is not. So, if
countries have a very diﬀerent mix of private and state pension arrangements, the measured
personal sector saving rates will not be comparable across these countries. To correct for this,
we must treat both types of pension savings in a similar manner.
10This is relatively straightforward if we assume that the present value of contributions to any
pension plan is equal to the present value of all pension payouts from the plan over the lifetime
of a cohort. Given this condition is satisﬁed, we could treat all private pension saving as if they
were contributions to a public PAYGO system, and all private pension receipts as if they were
public pension income. Such a change would not aﬀect our analysis if the present value of the
two streams are equal. Alternatively we could treat all contributions to a public PAYGO system
as private savings and ignore the public pension beneﬁts (as they are to be treated as returns
to the savings).
For the ﬁrst approach, treating private pensions as a PAYGO scheme, we need aggregate
data for contributions and payments, as well as for the amount of pension reserves. All these
data are available for funded pensions.8 We can and do check that private pension schemes are
roughly actuarially fair for the US and the UK. We therefore adopt the ﬁrst approach for this
pragmatic reason. It also has the advantage of reducing the size of potential measurement error
as this approach does not require us to adjust the Italian accounts, only the UK and the US;
an advantage because the national accounts for Italy are less detailed than the those for the US
and UK. All private contributions are therefore classiﬁed as a tax and pension payments – as
an income. In Section 3.4.3, we examine the validity of our assumption that the present value
of contributions equals that of the to payouts.
3.4 Looking at the data
3.4.1 Demography
Demographic factors play a signiﬁcant role in our empirical analysis, so we start with a discus-
sion of the demographic diﬀerences between the countries. Distributions of population by age
are plotted in the top panel of Figure 1. The distributions are all normalised so that y−axis
measures the percentage of total population (of a given age). The major diﬀerence between the
distributions is that Italians have much lower fertility rate than the other two countries. This
results in a smaller percentage of children as a proportion of the population.
The next two panels show how the household composition changes with the age of the head
of household. The family composition in the US and the UK is almost identical. In contrast in
Italy, unsurprisingly given the ﬁrst chart, there are fewer children in each household. However
more importantly for our analysis is the diﬀerence in the number of adult children per household.
In Italy, parents aged between 45 and 60 are twice as likely to be living with their adult children
as in the UK or US. As mentioned earlier, Guiso and Jappelli (1991) argue that the principal
reason for this diﬀerence is that many children choose to live with their parents until they can
aﬀord downpayment on their house.
3.4.2 Income
In Figure 2, we have plotted the per capita distribution of the components of non-capital income
by age as a ratio of average per capita income. We have split income into the three components;
gross labour income, yL
i,t, private and state pension payments minus pension contributions, yP
i,t,
8We could not do the other way, i.e. to reclassify state pensions as funded pensions, as we would need equivalent
data for PAYGO system, and they are not available.
11and all beneﬁts whether in kind or monetary net of tax payments, yT
i,t. We also look at two
components of yT
i,t – monetary taxes and beneﬁts, yTM
i,t , and beneﬁts in kind, yK
i,t. In all cases
the distributions are normalised by dividing through by average per capita income, Yt/Nt. The
reason for this split is that gross labour income can be seen as the basic return to labour and the
other two components can be seen as inter-generational transfers implemented through either
the pension system or the welfare state. The total net present value across the population of
net pension income, yP
i,t, is close to zero for all countries and the net present value of all welfare
transfers is only slightly positive; the welfare state is in part funded by indirect taxes which
are part of consumption expenditures. Therefore by analysing the transfers at this level, we
will be able to measure how the individual country welfare and pension arrangements aﬀect the
personal sector saving rate.
The main observations from Figures 2 are:
1. Gross labour income is earned at markedly diﬀerent times in the diﬀerent countries: Ital-
ians and Americans start working later than Britons, and Americans retire on average over
ﬁve years later. On their own, these data would suggest that both Italians and Americans
would wish to borrow more when they are young and, further, Americans would also wish
to save less for retirement as they tend to work longer.9
2. The pension payments in retirement are similar across the countries. However the Italians
start drawing their pension one or two years earlier than the British and ﬁve to six years
earlier than the Americans. The Italians also pay higher contributions to save for their
longer retirement.
3. The tax and beneﬁt system in the UK and the US eﬀect a similar level of redistribution
over an individual’s lifetime. In contrast the degree of redistribution from young to old
is more severe in Italy. We have plotted beneﬁt income net of indirect and direct taxes;
therefore the measured levels of redistribution are independent of the particular choice of
taxation.
4. Beneﬁts in kind for the old in Italy are drastically lower then they are in any other country.
Beneﬁts in kind predominantly consist of health expenditures and spending on education
for the young. The lower level of beneﬁts in kind in Italy, however, is partially compensated
by higher monetary beneﬁts for the old.
3.4.3 Consumption, Wealth and Average Propensities to Consume
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 3 plots the normalised consumption proﬁles. There are also some
noticeable diﬀerences between the countries. In the US, individuals choose to consume the most
when they are aged between 50 and 55; in both Italy and the UK, when they are aged between
40 and 50. In Italy there is also a very pronounced peak in the proﬁle around the age of 40. The
shape of this proﬁle in Italy can be explained by the family composition, which was discussed
above. In Italy, when the parents are aged between 45 and 65, they are almost twice as likely
to have their adult children, aged between 20 and 30, living with them as compared to their
9In part, this later retirement is caused by eligibility for medical help programmes.
12peers in the UK and US. If there are any economies of scale in the household, this will cause
individuals to reallocate their consumption from the ages of 20-30 and 45-65 to other periods of
their lives, namely to ages of 30 - 45 and after 65, when there are no such economies.
The second panel of Figure 3 plots the normalised distribution of total asset holdings10 by age
for the three countries. Three observations can be made: ﬁrst, Italians start saving signiﬁcant
amounts earlier than either their US or UK peers; second, Americans delay their savings with
compared to the British; third, the Americans, aged between 50 and 65 also save considerably
more of their income than their counterparts in the UK and US. Therefore, there are large
diﬀerences in the wealth proﬁles in the three countries; Americans and Italians save more than
the British for their retirement but the Italians start this saving much earlier than their American
counterparts. It is worth noting that total wealth holdings fall with age after retirement.11In
the third panel of Figure 3, we have plotted the estimated age-speciﬁc propensities to consume.
These are computed as age-speciﬁc consumption divided by total age-speciﬁc resources, under
the assumption that all pensions are reclassiﬁed on the PAYGO basis (see formula (2)).
Age-speciﬁc total resources is a sum of the age-speciﬁc non-human wealth and human wealth.
Non-human wealth includes all assets (ﬁnancial and real) and the human wealth is computed as
net present value of all future earnings, as described in Section 2.
In the US and the UK, the propensities to consume are almost identical. This can be
regarded as an informal test of the life-cycle model. Both countries have similarly developed
capital markets, similar ﬂexible labour markets, similar household composition and mortality
rates. Therefore, under the pure life cycle model the age-speciﬁc propensities to consume should
be similar. This is observed despite the income and wealth proﬁle being markedly diﬀerent in
these countries.
The cohort speciﬁc propensities to consume in Italy are signiﬁcantly lower for all age groups
before retirement. As we have argued earlier, we will regard this diﬀerence as an evidence
of the tight capital markets in Italy aﬀecting individual saving behaviour. Young adults save
more than they would like to because they are unable to borrow. This evidence supports the
conclusions of Jappelli and Pagano (1999) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000) who argue that the
heavy downpayment requirements for ﬁrst time home-buyers force young adults to save.
As discussed in Section 2, average propensities to consume are aﬀected by income uncertainty,
and the eﬀect of income uncertainty is bigger, the bigger the eﬀect of borrowing constraints.
Guiso et al. (2002), Kapteyn and Panis (2003) and Das and Donkers (1999) discuss that the
US face more income uncertainty than Italy. (Guiso et al. (1992a) also argued that a precau-
tionary motive in Italy was not a big explanatory factor.) B¨ orsch-Supan (2003) ranks the UK
in between the other two countries. This suggests that if we were able to ‘remove’ the eﬀect of
income uncertainty for every country, the gap between British and Italian average propensities
to consume would become wider.
Figure 4 plots the estimate of the APCs in both the US and UK ﬁrst assuming that the
private pensions system is treated as if it were a PAYGO system and, second, treating it as
a funded system. The estimates are very close12, which indicates that any measurement error
10Assets do not include private pension wealth.
11In the absence of cohort eﬀects, this would suggest that there is a signiﬁcant amount of dissaving in retirement.
12Pension wealth proﬁle is computed in assuming that individuals contribute percentage of their gross labour
income (which grows at rate g relatively to the currently observed cross-sectional proﬁle) until they reach statutory
13generated here is not likely to change our conclusions.
4 Decomposition of the National Saving Rates
We are now ready to demonstrate the main result of this paper. We use the approach suggested
by Gokhale et al. (1996) and described in Section 2. We use formula (3) but we need to adapt
it for our purposes. We assume that only consumers above the age of 19 are decision-makers.
Therefore, as discussed above, monetary consumption of children had to be attributed to their
parents, which was done for every household in micro-surveys. However, we could not do it with
children’s consumption of beneﬁts in kind, as we only had aggregate distributions of them by
age, so these beneﬁts remained attributed to children. The ﬁnal formula which we use can be
written as:


























where Yt is the national net disposable income, Nt is the total population, γt = Gt/Yt is the share
of government consumption, βt = Bt/Yt is the ratio of beneﬁts in kind, allocated to children,
to the national income; and all other variables describe age distributions and total resources of
adult population, as in formula (3).
Table 4 presents the results of the decomposition of the diﬀerences in the personal sector
savings rates between the countries. All projections are computed using the same constant
productivity growth rate. The results have been presented as a breakdown of the diﬀerence of
the saving rate in the US and Italy relative to the UK. The diﬀerence in rates is due to a sum
of several eﬀects, some of them are large and work in diﬀerent directions.
The principal conclusions from this analysis are:
1. The primary reason for the low saving rate in the US as compared to the UK can be
attributed to the diﬀerence in income proﬁles of the two countries; these are plotted
in Figure 2. There are two stark diﬀerences between these proﬁles. First, the young
Americans have a much lower incomes relative to their incomes in middle age than their
UK peers. The life-cycle model would predict that they would therefore wish to borrow
considerably more than their UK peers in their early working life. This would reduce the
national saving rate. Second, Americans retire on average 5-6 years later than their UK
peers, and so need to save less for their shorter retirement. This eﬀect is partially oﬀset
by the pension transfers which also start later in their lives.
2. The principal cause for the high national saving rate in Italy as compared to the UK is due
to the diﬀerence in the proﬁles of the age-speciﬁc average propensities to consume. As we
have argued, we attribute this diﬀerence to the binding borrowing constraints, particularly
pension age (diﬀerent for males and females and for diﬀerent countries). Then their resources are annuatised and
periodical pension payments are paid. The level of these periodical payments is computed in assuming currently
observed mortality rates, and it is adjusted for the growth rate of standards of living, g.
14in the housing market in Italy, which reduces the ability of Italians to borrow. Borrowing
constraints reduce unequivocally their average propensities to consume. The analysis also
suggests that if these borrowing constraints were relaxed, Italians would probably borrow
more than their UK peers in their early life though this would be partially oﬀset by their
less generous pension system.
3. The diﬀerence in demography between the countries can explain very little of the diﬀerence
in saving rates. Some researchers have suggested that the US saving rates is currently very
low relative to the past because of the present preponderance of the baby-boom generation;
however as all three countries experienced a similar baby-boom in the mid 1960s, this fact
can not explain the diﬀerences in saving rates across our countries.
4. The results also suggest that in the US, the national saving rate is higher relative to the
UK because of the diﬀerences in the tax and beneﬁt systems. The diﬀerence cannot be
explained by the diﬀerent health care systems – the eﬀect of beneﬁts in kind is small. It
is the timing of beneﬁts, related to the statutory retirement age, that causes most of the
diﬀerences. It is possible that people prefer to work longer (and thus the proﬁle of the
labour income is shifted to the right) in order to qualify for the beneﬁts. However, on
average Americans pay less taxes and get less beneﬁts when they are old, which encourages
saving.
As Gokhale et al. (1996) emphasise, these results ‘only convey the potential importance’
of various factors aﬀecting personal sector saving behaviour. As we stressed earlier, a single
economic ‘cause’ might aﬀect two or more of our measured factors. The most obvious example,
to which we devote considerable attention to in the next section, is the obvious link between
diﬀerences in the saving rates attributed to APCs and to the wealth proﬁles. The following
illustrates the point. Assume that either income uncertainty is lower or borrowing constraints
are tighter in Italy. Both are likely to reduce the young Italians’ propensity to consume. Given
their lower consumption, they will accumulate greater wealth at a younger age. Our analysis
relates their higher savings rate to their lower APC. However their lower APC leads to a greater
wealth accumulation which increases their consumption (the wealth eﬀect) and reduces their
savings rate ceteris paribus. Our analysis will therefore identify an increase in savings due to
the lower APCs but will also identify a decrease in savings due to the increase in per capita
wealth holdings; this latter eﬀect will partly oﬀset the former. However, both have the same
root cause. Table 4 illustrates this issue clearly. The diﬀerences in the savings rates associated
with the diﬀerences in the APC are clearly inversely correlated to the ones associated with the
diﬀerences in the wealth. Gokhale et al. (1996) make a similar observation with respect to the
old. They note that the rise in the average propensity to consume in old age is inversely related
to amount of wealth. This inter-reaction arises because the consumption and wealth proﬁles are
not independent but are jointly determined. For a given income stream and interest rates, then
choosing a path for consumption determines the path for wealth (via the wealth accumulation
equation) and visa-versa.
In the next section we address this issue. As before we look in turn at a diﬀerences in either
the age distribution of non-capital resources, or in the age-speciﬁc propensities to consume. For
15each case we ﬁrst estimate the change in wealth holdings ωa,t induced by a change in any of
these proﬁles. We then estimate the joint impact of changing both the proﬁle and the wealth
distribution, in line with this estimate, on national savings. This gives an estimate of the overall
impact on national savings that takes in account the joint determination of consumption and
wealth.
In addition, this approach also allows us to estimate how much of the distribution of wealth
holdings by age cannot be explained by either diﬀerences in the age distribution of non-capital
resources, or diﬀerences in the APCs. We suggest that diﬀerences in the both the size and
timing of inter-generational private transfers might account for any residual diﬀerences. Though
we feel this interpretation is instructive, we also stress that these estimates of the size of inter-
generational transfers are only rough and so we exercise a healthy degree of caution.
5 Further Investigations
Before describing how we estimate the diﬀerences in the wealth proﬁles induced by a diﬀerence
in either the distribution of non-capital resources or age-speciﬁc propensities to consume, we
need to look at the wealth accumulation equation at a cohort level. This can be written
wa+1,t+1 = (1 + rt)wa,t + yNC
a,t − ca,t + ta,t (6)
where rt is the real return on wealth and term ta,t is a residual income term. In what follows,
we shall equate this source of residual income with inter-vivos transfers and bequests, or more
precisely private intergenerational transfers. Intergenerational transfers are not recorded in
the national accounts as they are transfers within the personal sector from one generation to
another and so net out in aggregate.13 However, the conventional view is that such transfers
are considerable but are diﬃcult to estimate accurately, see, among others, Wolﬀ (1999), Guiso
and Jappelli (1991) and Guiso and Jappelli (1998).
We propose estimating these transfers from two years of cross-sectional wealth data for
wealth, benchmarked to national accounts aggregates in that year. We cannot stress too strongly,
that estimation of any quantity as a residual is always problematic because of accumulation of
measurement errors. In our case, the main source of errors is likely to be either from errors in
the estimates of the relative age proﬁle of wealth or from estimates of the real return in the
year of interest. In the accompanying working paper, Kirsanova and Sefton (2006), we perform
a couple of checks on these estimates. Firstly we check whether the implied real interest rate
in the aggregate wealth identity is equal to the observed real return in that year. Secondly,
under the assumption that those who die in any year have the same average level of wealth as
those who survived14, we check whether these proﬁles of transfers can generate the observed
level of bequests. The data do broadly satisfy these tests. Even so, we shall not labour our
interpretation. However some analysis is informative.
13In theory they could be included in the personal sector accounts as transfers in both the resources and uses
accounts. However the diﬃculty in measuring them makes this almost impossible.
14In reality, this condition is unlikely to be strictly satisﬁed. The correlation between income and life expectancy
has been well documented, see for example Kaplan et al. (1996).
165.1 Intergenerational Transfers
In the top panel of Figure 5, we present our estimates of inter-generational private transfers,
normalised by per capita income. As it would be expected, the young receive and the old give.
The amount of money transferred is large. However a large proportion of these transfers will be
intra-household. So for example young Italians, who tend to live with their parents to a much
later age see Figure 1, tend to receive more than their UK and US peers. On the converse side,
in Italy adults over 45 are net givers to other generations (to their children) whereas in the UK
and US these generations are still receiving from the older generations. The amounts transferred
on average are the smallest in the UK. In the US, individuals aged between 60-70 transfer a
sizeable proportion of their income to younger generations.
The estimated size of these private inter-generational transfers in the US is high. Our
estimates are larger than the estimates given in both Wolﬀ (1999) and Gale and Scholz (1994);
however the two are not directly comparable. As we mentioned, our ﬁgures include intra-
household transfers whereas the ﬁgures of Wolﬀ (1999) and Gale and Scholz (1994) do not.
Further, we also believe that Wolﬀ’s approach would have underestimated the level of inter-vivos
transfers. He chose to estimate the cohort-speciﬁc saving rates from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX). However, as Slesnick (1992) shows, the CEX survey underestimates consumption
by almost 30% whereas income is barely underestimated. Hence the age-speciﬁc saving rate will
be over-estimated, and thus estimates of inter-vivos transfers are biased down.
It is interesting to see how an account for inter-generational private transfers alters estimates
of age-speciﬁc savings rates. We deﬁne disposable income of an individual aged a as yd
a =
yNC





a. This deﬁnition includes all returns to wealth, capital gains and capital income.
It therefore diﬀers from the national accounting deﬁnition but it does ensure comparability












Panel two in Figure 5 plots the age-speciﬁc savings rates ignoring any inter-generational
private transfers. The young in both Italy and America consume considerably more than their
income in their early lives. In Britain this trait is less marked, principally because they earn
more, see Figure 2, rather than spend less. In Italy, all cohorts from age 25 until retirement,
save considerably more than their peers in the other two countries. After retirement, all cohorts
in all countries are savers as they consume less than their income.
In the third panel of Figure 5 we plot age-speciﬁc savings rates once inter-generational
private transfers have been included as part of income. This proﬁles can be understood as
being consistent with the distribution of wealth by age. They suggest that all cohorts save until
retirement and dis-save afterwards, and hence are in line with predictions from the standard life-
cycle model of savings. Young adults in Italy, though, still save far more than their counterparts
in the US and the UK.
5.2 Adjusting for the joint determinacy of consumption and wealth
In this section we discuss an approach to controlling for the joint determination of consumption
and wealth holdings. We try to estimate the changes to the age distribution of capital resources
induced by changes to the age distribution of non-capital resources, or by changes in the age-
17speciﬁc propensities to consume. Inevitably this requires making further assumptions. Among
these, the most critical is that the parameters of the model are stable over time. Clearly this
is a strong assumption and is unlikely to be satisﬁed precisely. Despite these obvious problems,
we believe the analysis does provide some further insight. For this reason this analysis must be
viewed as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the analysis in Section 2.
Formally, we assume that all generations, which are alive in t = 1997, have previously faced
the same growth adjusted non-capital income proﬁle. Namely, an individual born in t − s at
time t − s + a (i.e. aged a) has income of:
yNC




a,t is the cross-sectional income distribution in 1997. Therefore the present value of an











i=1 µi is the probability of the individual being alive at age a.15. We now use
our life-cycle model of consumption to simulate the wealth proﬁle. To describe this simulation
process, denote the simulated consumption and wealth of an individual aged a in year t as ˆ ca,t
and ˆ wa,t respectively. If we initialise the wealth proﬁle at ˆ w0,t−s = 0 for all s, then we simulate




(1 + r)a−u "
yNC
u,t+u−s − ˆ cu,t+u−s
￿
, (9)
ˆ ca,t+a−s = αa (ha,t+a−s + ˆ wa,t+a−s). (10)
where it is assumed that the real interest rate r and growth rate g are constant. Some straight-
forward algebra shows that the diﬀerence between the implied proﬁles and the observed proﬁles
in year t is the accumulated return to the inter-generational private transfers discussed in the
previous section,
wa,t − ˆ wa,t =
a−1 X
u=1
(1 + r)a−utu,t+u−a. (11)
We shall therefore refer to this residual wealth proﬁles (the wealth accumulation that can not be
explained by our simple simulation model) as the accumulated value of private inter-generational
transfers.
We are now in a position to describe how we can decompose the diﬀerences in the saving rates
between two countries, country A and country B, taking into account the joint determination of
consumption and savings. As before, we replace the proﬁle from one country by the proﬁle from
another country. However as these proﬁles are measured in diﬀerent units, they must ﬁrst be
15This analysis eﬀectively assumes that all transfers are unanticipated, as the they are not been included within
the estimate of the present value of all non-capital income. Although in reality some of these transfers might be
anticipated (see Poterba (1994) and Guiso and Jappelli (1998)), we ignore this issue here. The associated working
paper Kirsanova and Sefton (2006) investigates this issue in more detail.
18normalised. In section 4, we followed Gokhale et al. (1996) and normalised by dividing through
by average resources per capital, Rt/Nt. However, as resources, Rt include aggregate wealth, this
factor is no longer constant across our simulations. Instead we therefore normalise by dividing
through by average labour income at age 35, yL
35,t. This implies that our decomposition of the
savings rates is now in the form





















As the ratio of labour income at age 35, yL
35,t, to net national income per capita, (Yt/Nt), is
almost the same for all three countries (see Figure 2, top panel), normalising by labour income
at age 35, yL
35,t ensures that changes in the saving rates due to changes in the proﬁles can be
interpreted as changes in the distribution.16 Once proﬁles are normalised, we can replace the
proﬁle of country A by the corresponding normalised proﬁle of country B. We then simulate
a new implied wealth distribution ˆ wa,t with this proﬁle; denote this as ˆ w∗
a,t. Our ﬁnal implied






(1 + r)a−utu,t+u−a. (12)
We now repeat the analysis of section 4 as before except that now we substitute out the relevant
proﬁle with the normalised proﬁle from the other country and further the wealth proﬁle wa,t
with the simulated proﬁle in equation (12).
5.3 Results
Table 5 records our results from this experiment. For example, the entry in the ﬁrst column
and the ﬁrst row suggests that if Britons had the same average propensity to consume as the
Americans, the British national saving rate would be 1.20% higher. We observe that all conclu-
sions from the analysis in Section 4 are robust to this new approach. The diﬀerences in savings
rates attributable to the diﬀerent factors have similar relative, but slightly smaller, magnitudes;
this is because we are now measuring the sum of the direct impact of the diﬀerences plus the
oﬀsetting impact of the induced changes in wealth. Thus our broad conclusions from Section 4
remain unchanged.
This table also includes results of a ﬁnal check of this approach. We investigate how closely
our proﬁles are able to reproduce the observed wealth to income ratios in each country in 1997.
This data is recorded in the last line of Table 5. For every cohort alive we simulate the wealth
holdings as of 1997, using the model in Section 5.2. (For this exercise, it is important to treat
employers’ contributions to private pension funds as part of income, see the lengthy discussion
in Section 3.3). We then use the 1997 population distribution to obtain aggregate wealth to
labour income ratio. These simulated income to wealth ratios are recorded in the penultimate
16Another reason for choosing to normalise the proﬁles by labour income at age 35, y
L
35,t is that labour income
at age 35 can be regarded as being approximately independent of any diﬀerences in retirement ages or tertiary
education arrangements between countries.Therefore income at this age, at least approximately, can be considered
exogenous to the model.
19line of Table 5. For interest rates of 5%, we can match the observed wealth to income ratios
in the UK and Italy. Our model under-predicts the observed income-wealth ratio in the US.
The most likely explanation for this under-prediction is the high equity returns over the period
1995–1998. If we either use a US wealth proﬁle generated from 1995 data to estimate our proﬁle
of inter-generational transfers, or we calculate the wealth- income ratio assuming interest rates
are 7%, we are able to closely match the observed US wealth to income ratio17.
6 Conclusions
We believe that this paper oﬀers two contributions to the literature. The ﬁrst is ‘descriptive’;
using a uniﬁed accounting framework and a wide variety of survey data sources, we compiled a
complete proﬁle of the average level of all incomes and expenditures of a typical individual by age
and gender (including all income in kind such as government education and health expenditure).
This allows us to visualise diﬀerences in consumer behaviour in the UK, US and Italy.
Our second contribution is ‘normative’; we attempted to quantify and explain diﬀerences in
saving behaviour, as measured by national saving rates. Using the life-cycle framework we are
able to answer the following question – if an average Italian expected to receive the same income
over his lifetime as an American (or British) would he or she save more or less than the average
American (or British).
Our work suggested that US saving rates are lower predominantly because of the diﬀerence
in retirement ages. The average American tends to work on average almost six years longer
than the average Briton or Italian. As expected lifetimes are almost identical in each of these
countries, the average American needs to save less.
To explain the diﬀerence between the UK and Italy we focused on a very diﬀerent mechanism.
All the evidence suggested that the Italians saved more than the British because they were
unable to borrow, particularly when they were young. In Italy capital markets, and especially
the mortgage market, are far more restrictive than in the UK.
We also revealed the insigniﬁcance of some other, potentially important, factors. We found
that demography could explain little of the observed diﬀerences in saving rates. This is not
surprising, since the current demography in all three countries is very similar. Though our
countries have very diﬀerent tax and beneﬁt systems, we found that each of these systems
implicitly imposed a similar amount of inter-generational redistribution. This implies that the
contrasting tax and beneﬁt systems are unlikely to be the cause of the observed diﬀerences in
saving rates.
17See the associated working paper, Kirsanova and Sefton (2006), for a more thorough discussion
20A Allocation of Household Consumption and Wealth
The practical problem when treating individuals, rather than households, as a decision making
unit, is how to allocate household consumption, income and wealth among the adult members of a
household. For descriptive purposes we shall make the following deﬁnitions. All individuals aged
18 or younger are treated as dependent children18, the head of households and their partners, if
any, are called the principal adults, and any other adults in the household are called dependent
adults. We shall start by describing the allocation of consumption. All consumption is allocated
among all adults and children using the following age equivalence scale. The consumption level of
a newborn baby was assumed to constitute 30% of that of an adult, and this proportion increased
linearly until by the age of 18 a dependent child was assumed to consume as much as every other
adult in the household. After allocating all consumption in this manner, the consumption of all
dependent children was then reallocated equally between the principal adults.
The allocation of wealth is done diﬀerently. All housing wealth is distributed equally between
the principal adults whereas ﬁnancial wealth is distributed equally among all adults except for
those younger than 30 and in full time education.
Finally, income is allocated wherever possible to the individual who was receiving it. For
those cases, such as housing beneﬁt, where there is no clear benefactor the income is divided
equally among the principal adults.
To clarify this allocation scheme consider the following example: a household consists of
a working head of household aged 55, a partner aged 50, their working son of 25, a student
daughter of 22, a schoolboy of 8 and a parent of the head of household aged 80. We assume the
annual consumption of the household is 100, their total ﬁnancial wealth is 1000 and their housing
assets are worth 2000. Line 1 of Table 3 gives the ratio of consumption using the age equivalence
scale; line 2 gives the initial allocation of consumption according to this equivalence scale and
line 3 gives the ﬁnal consumption allocation. The ﬁnal two lines give household allocation of
ﬁnancial and housing wealth.
A possible problem with this allocation scheme is that it may overestimate the wealth of
younger generations by assigning them too high share of the household wealth. But our method
is consistent across countries, and we do control for non-earners.
B Further Measurement Issues
B.1 Labour Income and Operating surplus
It is often impossible to breakdown the value added of unincorporated business into the return
to capital and the return to labour; this inevitably increases the error in estimates of both
the return to wealth and the labour income. As a solution to this problem, we assume for all
countries that 70% of the total income from unincorporated business could be regarded as labour
income, and the rest is pooled with operating surplus.
18We ignored the odd households where the head of household was 18 or younger.
21B.2 Health Care
The majority of the medical services in the UK and Italy are provided via the NHS as income
in kind and ﬁnanced by taxes. In the US, on the other hand, employers contribute to the
group medical insurance and these contributions are classiﬁed as ‘other labour income’, similar
to social security contributions. The Americans then pay cash for medical services and receive
reimbursement for these expenditures later. Group insurance involves people of working age,
with similar risks, so the age proﬁle of contributions and payments should be roughly the same.
In order to bring American accounts in consistency with other countries’ national accounts,
we add two extra items into American National Accounts – additional ‘tax’ payments and
additional ‘beneﬁts in kind’; we also treat those medical consumer expenditures, which are
reimbursed, as consumption in kind, as we do for the other two countries. When changing
classiﬁcation, we implicitly assume that diﬀerent ways of health ﬁnance create the same level of
‘income and consumption uncertainty’. But we are not able to investigate eﬀect of uncertainty
in our framework.
B.3 Age Distribution of Payments from Private Pension Funds
In the British and American household surveys, households only report periodical pension pay-
ments, but not the surrender and refund values. In Britain, the surrender and refund values
constitute about a third of all private pension payments in the National Accounts and have
to be attributed to the younger households. We use the data from the Association of British
Insurers on private pensions and assumed that the decision to surrender is most commonly asso-
ciated with divorce, so we used divorce statistics to construct age proﬁles. We give more details
in Kirsanova and Sefton (2006) on this allocation. We use the same methodology to allocate
surrender and refund values from American pension funds.
22Table 1: Sectoral Decomposition of National Savings in 1997 by Country
Total Household & Non- Corporate Public
Economy Proﬁt Institutions Sector Sector
Gross Operating Surplus∗ 236,526 58,104 165,946 12,476
Labour Income+ 461,637 461,637 – –
Net Property Income 11,087 40,838 -6,499 -23,252
Taxes on Production 104,725 - - 104,725
Gross National Income 813,974 560,578 159,447 93,949
Taxes and Social Contrib. 452 -180,309 -1,101 181,862
Social Beneﬁts -564 164,348 -48,610 -116,302
United Net Other Transfers -2,343 11,411 89 -13,843
Kingdom Social Beneﬁts in Kind - 88,450 - -88,450
(£ mln) Gross Disposable Income 811,519 556,028 109,825 57,216
Collective Consumption -59,958 - - -59,958
Individual Consumption -517,909 -517,909 - -
Social Beneﬁts in Kind -88,450 -88,450 - -
Gross Saving 145,202 38,119 109,825 -2,742
Depreciation -94,524 -22,043 -62,382 -10,099
Net Saving 50,678 16,076 47,443 -12,841
Gross Operating Surplus∗ 1,813 215 1,417 181
Labour Income+ 5,182 5,182 -4 -
Net Property Income 767 1,055 96 -384
Taxes on Production 664 - 37 627
Gross National Income 8,422 6,453 1,546 423
Taxes and Social Contrib. - -1,077 -238 1,306
Social Beneﬁts - 19 -72 -91
United Net Other Transfers -40 -21 -9 -10
States Social Beneﬁts in Kind - 1,148 -261 -887
($ bn) Gross Disposable Income 8,383 6,484 966 933
Collective Consumption -773 - - -773
Individual Consumption -4,940 -4,940 - -
Social Beneﬁts in Kind -1,148 -1,148 - -
Gross Saving 1,522 396 966 159
Depreciation -1,010 -250 -579 -181
Net Saving 512 269 264 -21
Gross Operating Surplus∗ 699,999 220,944 454,422 24,633
Labour Income+ 1,060,819 1,060,819 - -
Net Property Income -18,251 379,121 -223,299 -174,073
Taxes on Production 223,000 - - 223,000
Gross National Income 1,965,567 1,660,884 231,123 -73,560
Taxes and Social Contrib. 211 -588,589 -34,297 623,097
Social Beneﬁts 546 403,335 -58,652 -344,137
Net Other Transfers -7,746 -18,748 6,055 4,947
Italy Social Beneﬁts in Kind - 163,428 - -163,428
(Lira bn) Gross Disposable Income 1,958,578 1,620,310 144,229 194,039
Collective Consumption -197,103 - - -197,103
Individual Consumption -1,167,846 -1,167,846 - -
Social Beneﬁts in Kind -163,428 -163,428 - -
Gross Saving 430,201 289,036 144,229 -3,064
Depreciation -256,754 -81,799 -150,681 -24,274
Net Saving 173,447 207,237 -6,452 -27,338
Note: ∗ – includes Mixed Income; + – includes Wages and Employer’s Social Contributions.
23Table 2: Saving and Spending Rates
UK US Italy
Net Household Saving Rate, ((Y − C − G)/(Y − G)), % 7.7 7.8 11.5
Net National Saving Rate, ((Y − C − G)/Y ), % 7.1 6.9 10.2
Net Government Spending Rate (G/Y ), % 8.4 10.5 11.6
Rate of Government Spending in Kind on Children, (B/Y ), % 5.2 4.6 5.8
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999), Oﬃce for National Statistics
(2000), ISTAT (2000) and authors’ calculations.
Table 3: Allocation scheme for a household’s consumption and wealth
Relation to head Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Partner Head Parent of
Head
Total
Age 8 22 25 50 55 80
Source of income – – work – work pension
Consumption
weight




10.7 17.86 17.86 17.86 17.86 17.86 100
Final consump-
tion allocation
0 17.86 17.86 17.86+10.7/2 17.86+10.7/2 17.86 100
Financial wealth
allocation
0 0 250 250 250 250 1000
Housing wealth
allocation
0 0 0 1000 1000 0 2000
24Table 4: Decomposition of the diﬀerences in National Savings Rates between Countries
UK US IT US IT
interest rate r = 3% r = 5%
National Savings Rate (NSR) 7.1 6.9 10.2 6.9 10.2
Diﬀerence with UK NSR -0.13 3.12 -0.13 3.12
of which:
1. Average Propensity to Consume, αa,t 1.85 9.61 1.89 10.52
2. Demographic factors, pa,t -1.01 0.64 -1.01 0.64
3. Total Resources 1.09 -5.47 0.97 -6.93
of which:
3a. Level of Resources, ρt 0.41 -2.50 0.91 -4.73
3b. Distribution of Resources 0.68 -2.88 0.06 -2.08
of which:
3bi. Non-Capital Resources, ψa,t: 3.28 7.15 2.81 9.61
Labour income, yL
a,t -14.34 -1.73 -13.22 -0.59
Net pension income, yP
a,t 9.12 2.53 8.25 3.74
Taxes and Beneﬁts: 8.51 6.35 7.78 6.46
Net monetary transfers, yT
a,t 10.26 2.50 9.94 3.03
Beneﬁts in kind, yK
a,t -1.76 3.85 -2.17 3.43
3bii. Capital Resources, ωa,t -2.60 -10.03 -2.75 -11.69
4. Government Expenditures, γt -2.12 -3.22 -2.12 -3.22
5. Beneﬁts in kind allocated to children∗, βt -0.64 0.60 -0.64 0.60
Table 5: Decomposition of the diﬀerences in National Savings Rates between Countries allowing
for the joint determinacy of consumption and wealth.
UK US IT UK US IT
interest rate r = 3% r = 5%
National Savings Rate (NSR) 7.1 6.9 10.2 6.9 10.2
Diﬀerence with UK NSR -0.13 3.12 -0.13 3.12
of which:
1. Average Propensity to Consume, αa,t 1.20 6.25 1.29 8.08
2. Demographic factors, pa,t 0.05 -0.23 0.39 -0.20
3. Non-capital resources 1.94 9.04 1.12 9.54
of which:
Labour income, yL
a,t -19.31 -2.35 -20.5 -2.86
Net pension income, yP
a,t 8.59 4.35 8.20 4.82
Taxes and Beneﬁts: 8.33 7.29 7.79 7.18
Net monetary transfers, yT
a,t 10.74 3.85 10.38 4.03
Beneﬁts in kind, yK
a,t -2.30 3.40 -2.46 3.09
Inter-vivos transfers, ta,t 1.13 -0.81 1.08 -0.61
4. Government Expenditures, γt -2.12 -3.22 -2.12 -3.22
5. Beneﬁts in kind allocated to children, βt -0.64 0.60 -0.64 0.60
Simulated Wealth to Income Ratio 3.5 1.8 5.5 4.8 2.6 8.3
For reference: Wealth to Income Ratio in 1997 4.7 4.4 9.1 4.7 4.4 9.1
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Figure 1: Distribution by Age of the Total Population (Panel 1) and Composition of Households
by Age of Head of Household (Panels 2 and 3)
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Figure 2: The averge value of the four components of non-capital income by cohort age expressed
as ratio of per capita national income.









































Figure 3: The average consumption (Panel 1), wealth holdings (Panel 2) and Propensity to
Consume (Panel 3) by cohort age. The data in the ﬁrst two panels is expressed as ratio of per
capita national income.
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Average Propensity to Consume for the U.S.A., α, as a %
PAYGO
funded
Figure 4: Comparison of the estimates of the Averge Propensity to Consume (APC) by cohort
age for both the UK and US under diﬀerent accounting assumptions. The ﬁrst approach treats
all private pensions contributions as a tax, and all pension recipts as a transfer (i.e. similar
to the accounting treatment of state PAYGO schemes); the second treats all private pension
contributions as savings (i.e. similar to the accounting treatment of fully funded private DC
pension scheme).
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Figure 5: Average net private inter-generational transfers (Panel 1), average saving rates not
including private inter-generational transfers as income (Panel 2) and average saving rates in-
cluding inter-generational transfers as income (Panel 3) by cohort age. The data in the ﬁrst panel
is expressed as a ratio of average per capita income. Note: disposable income is yd
a = yNC
a +rwa
is deﬁned in Section 5.1.
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